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Summary 
The new era of American empire commenced with decisive military victories in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  But the aftermath of war has proved surprisingly difficult and 
violent.  Explanations of America’s failure to win the peace have largely overlooked 
the inherent difficulty of planting democracy in so inhospitable a social environment 
as Iraq’s.  This paper examines the prospects for American empire, focusing on the 
problem of nation-building, and in particular the role of a well-functioning civil 
society in making democracy work. 
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Introduction 
On October 7th, 2001, American bombers and fighters from Missouri, Diego Garcia 
the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf converged in the skies over Afghanistan to 
launch a massive air campaign against the Taliban regime.3  Across the country 
bombs and cruise missiles pounded airfields, air defenses, radar and communication 
systems, fuel depots, barracks, training camps, and Taliban offices and homes in a 
carefully orchestrated burst of violence.4  Residents of Kabul described terrifying 
nights as huge explosions illuminated the horizon;5 residents of Kandahar reported 
panic in the city. 6  Over 10 weeks, some 12,000 bombs and missiles carrying upwards 
of 17 million pounds of explosives7 destroyed enemy opposition.  By December 7th, 
after only 61 days, the war for Afghanistan was effectively over.  A regime that ruled 
the country with a medieval mind and an iron fist was decimated, its remains driven 
into the mountains and caves of Tora Bora and bombed without mercy.  In Kabul, a 
new administration led by US ally Hamid Karzai took over. 
On March 20th, 2003, the US opened the war to unseat Saddam Hussein. 8  
Massive air and ground operations saw missiles, precision guided bombs, and heavy 
artillery batter Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk,9 while American and British forces 
secured ports and oil installations in the south. 10  Over the month that followed, some 
29,000 bombs and missiles detonated in Iraq, flattening the regime’s buildings, 
disrupting it’s command, control, and intelligence, crippling its ability to talk to 
itself.11  In a rapid ground advance, US and British troops thrust up 250 miles from 
the Kuwaiti border into the heart of the country12, easily capturing Baghdad.  Despite 
fears of bloody urban warfare, no serious threat to the offensive materialized, and by 
mid-April the US-led coalition had triumphed. 
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In both cases military victory was complete and comparatively easy to 
achieve.  But in both, postwar pacification and the installation of new governments 
has proved a complicated, bloody ordeal.  In Afghanistan the new president relies on 
foreign soldiers for protection, his writ does not extend beyond Kabul, and large 
swathes of the countryside remain lawless.13  And in Iraq more American soldiers 
have been killed since Pres. Bush declared hostilities over than died conquering the 
country. 14 
 The paradox of an easy war and difficult peace has been extensively debated 
in the press and other public fora.15  Explanations offered so far focus mostly on three 
factors: (i) insufficient planning and preparation by the US government for the 
aftermath of war; (ii) insufficient military force on the ground to physically control 
Iraq; and (iii) the continuing inability to catch or kill Saddam Hussein, which is 
thought to inspire loyalists to terrorist acts.  All three explanations are remediable, and 
– if true – provide grounds for comfort.16 
 But there is a deeper and more ominous possibility which has so far largely 
escaped public discussion – that the task of bringing democracy to a people as 
tyrannized as Iraqis and Afghanis historically have been is by its very nature 
undoable.  This is because democracy relies on a complex, multi- layered web of civic 
organizations for a number of its most basic functions.  But regimes such as Saddam’s 
or the Taliban’s regard such organizations as competing structures of power, and 
deliberately and systematically undermine them.  The organizations that give form to 
and empower individual initiative are gradually destroyed, or prevented from 
emerging in the first place, leaving citizens atomized and powerless before the 
authority of the state.  Society is “de-structured”.  As a socio-political foundation for a 
new political order, this is quicksand.  Democracy will not work in such an 
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environment.  This is a considerably more worrying explanation of America’s post-
war troubles, as remedies will exist only in the long term if at all.  It implies that 
America will eventually face an unpleasant choice between a long-term, expensive 
physical and social reconstruction, or a quicker withdrawal that leaves the conquered 
country either in the hands of a new dictator, albeit one friendly to US interests, or in 
a semi-anarchic, possibly violent state. 
 This paper examines the problem of nation-building, both conceptually and 
historically, focusing on the complex role of civil society in sustaining democracy.  I 
first define “empire”, and then set forth the logic that underpins this shift in US 
international posture.  The main part of the essay identifies four key objections to the 
imperial project.  The most important of these is the problem of trying to graft 
democracy onto a dysfunctional civil society.  The second is America’s abysmal 
record over the past 50 years in transforming conquered countries into peaceful, 
prosperous democracies.  The third concerns the inappropriateness of the instrument 
chosen for post-war national reconstruction.  And the fourth is the straightforward 
contradiction between the principal problem, terrorism, and the solution chosen, 
military conquest.  Together, these four objections suggest that American empire will 
fail. 
A New Empire for America? 
The wars of conquest in Afghanistan and Iraq, together with the overarching 
policy framework in which they were launched, are part of a coherent and 
fundamental re-direction of American policy that governs, at the most basic level, 
how the United States engages with the world.  Far from isolated or idiosyncratic 
events, they demonstrate that a new era of American empire has begun.  At this point 
it is important to define “empire”, an emotionally charged word used less often as an 
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analytical concept and more often as a term of abuse.  By empire I mean the policy of 
extending one’s authority over foreign countries by force.  In the current international 
context, this means the armed invasion of countries deemed to threaten US interests, 
whose governments will be ousted and replaced with US-sanctioned regimes.  This 
simple, behavioral definition of imperialism is consistent with generations of 
scholarship going back to Thucydides (395 BC), and including Doyle (1986) and 
Hobsbawm (1987).17,18  When one country conquers and controls another, an imperial 
relationship is established.  In this straightforward sense, the US has become an 
imperial power.19  Note that there is nothing here of “informal” empire – cultural and 
political domination exercised via multilateral institutions and broader economic 
relations – which many accused America of establishing during the post-war era.  
Rather our concern is empire in the old style, fashioned by firepower and infantry, 
where control of a territory is decided by war. 
The Logic of Empire 
Contrary to the more extreme opponents of the US administration, the new 
American empire was not launched reflexively, without thought or cause.  It is rather 
a deliberate response to the new challenges and dangers that America faces.  The logic 
of empire is deep and powerful, and works in the following way.  Scattered amongst 
the world’s poorer and less stable nations is a chaotic fringe where government and/or 
society seem locked in pathological decay.  In many the state and rule of law have 
become undisguised instruments of oppression; in others they have broken down 
entirely, and societies have descended into misrule and chaos.  Among these countries 
are some of the most violent, cruel and miserable places on earth.  Like North Korea, 
where an aggressive, economically inept hereditary tyranny fires missiles over Japan 
while its citizens are forced to eat their seed-grain and starve.  Or Sudan, where the 
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government starves its citizens and undermines its neighbors’ stability in a cynical 
quest for oil.  Or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where foreign and private 
armies maraud in search of diamonds and gold, and some 3 to 4½ million people have 
died over the past decade.  Or Myanmar, or Angola, or Liberia.  Where such nations 
are concerned the term “developing country” is nonsensical – they inhabit a fourth 
world of predation and decay. 
Some of these governments actively promote, and others fails to prevent, the 
emergence of ideologically-driven anti-American, anti-West movements.  The origin 
of such movements is complicated and contentious, but the fact that they have arisen 
is not.  The conventional stance – offering aid money and technical assistance through 
specia lized institutions – is a misguided approach to this bottom tier of countries.  
Rather than fomenting development, it facilitates their continued plunder by the 
strongmen who misrule them, and ultimately inflicts greater suffering and death on 
their people.  A more robust approach is called for.  Such an approach must recognize 
that the principal problem is not a flawed development strategy, but regimes that 
make development impossible.  For the good of their suffering peoples these regimes 
must be changed, by force if necessary. 
In the past the US dealt with the most egregious of these cases by either 
befriending their leaders in the hope of attenuating their excesses (where American 
interests were concerned), or breaking off relations and ignoring them in the comfort 
that they were very far away.  But the increasing ease of travel and communication, 
combined with the accelerating spread over time of technologies of mass destruction – 
aided greatly by the collapse of the Soviet Union – means that neither option is 
tenable any longer.  The lesson that the new imperialism draws from September 11th 
is that unsuccessful societies can no longer be left to fester.  Oppression and privation 
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create resentments that feed murderous extremism.  And extremism poses a direct 
threat to US national security at home.  Small bands of men with operational bases on 
the chaotic fringe can inflict catastrophic acts of violence on our people, in our cities.  
For the sake of American security, such countries must be reorganized from first 
principles.  The only viable “reorganizer” is the dominant superpower (accompanied 
by any willing allies).  And who better to take on this monumental challenge than a 
country founded on a universalistic ideology of freedom, democracy and self-
determination? 
 The marriage of a humanitarian impulse with the need for national security 
creates a powerful justification for invading and taking over foreign countries.  This is 
how the matter is framed at the highest levels of American government; both sides of 
the argument appear in the last two State of the Union addresses, as well as the 2002 
National Security Strategy.  Invade to end tyranny and oppression, and spread 
freedom, democracy and human rights across the globe.  Invade to improve the lives 
of foreign peoples so they are not tempted by extremist ideologies of hate.  And where 
hatred flourishes, invade as a last resort, to capture or kill the enemy and keep the 
most powerful weapons out of his hands.  This is the case for American empire.  It is 
a powerful logic whose principal motivation is not ideology, beliefs or ambition, but 
rather the objective reality that the US and her allies now face.  The logic would have 
been present if Al Gore had assumed the Presidency, and will continue to operate after 
George Bush has stepped down.  Ideology, beliefs and political ambition are of course 
important motivating elements of any policy shift.  But the present impulse to empire 
is more important because it is deeper and more pervasive, and hence more powerful. 
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Altruism vs. War 
To understand how powerful, consider the underlying imperative to which 
each half of the argument responds.  International development was undertaken out of 
a concern for the welfare of the world’s poor and respect for a common humanity.  
And if along the way western countries’ commercial interests could be promoted, so 
much the better.  But commercial interests did not require aid to succeed, and over 
time disenchantment drove finance for international aid down to around 0.1% of GDP 
per year in the US.  This is a rough measure of what we may call the “altruistic 
imperative”.  By contrast, the “national security imperative” motivated defense 
spending of 4% to 6% of US GDP per year over the past 20 years.  Measured in this 
rough-and-ready way, the national security imperative is some 50 times greater than 
the altruistic imperative, which itself drove 50 years of development.  Added together, 
the two promise to motivate a potent, richly funded and long- lived enterprise.  Where 
unfriendly governments or disorder and social anomie threaten US security, America 
will grant itself the right to invade, occupy and reorganize.  Offending countries will 
be given ultimata that they will fail to satisfy, and they will join the American empire. 
The Emperor’s Clothes 
The case for empire is strong, and its pursuit won the administration huge 
popularity at home.  But unfortunately the question of empire is not so simple.  In 
particular, a rationale built not on selfish economic and strategic interests in the 19th 
century mold, but rather on broader considerations of security combined with the 
welfare of oppressed peoples, is immediately subject to four powerful objections.  
These arise from both logical flaws in the underlying premises of the argument, and 
compelling evidence from recent history.  Where logical contradictions are concerned, 
it is important to note that these are implicit in the opening assumptions – those 
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stressed by the US government itself in the justifications for war in Afghanistan and 
Iraq20 – and are not introduced by the conceptual framework which I have built 
around them. 
1. Nurturing Democracy: The Governance-Society Nexus 
The first objection – the most nuanced and easily the most far-reaching – is 
that the imperial project ignores the importance of the governance-society nexus.  Its 
targets for conquest and democratization – nations that breed terror – are largely 
places where society does not work.  In some, such as Liberia and the Congo, war 
destroyed essential social bonds and structures.  And in others, such as Afghanistan, 
North Korea and Iraq, tyranny deliberately and systematically undermined them in 
order to stamp out alternative structures of power and resistance.  In both cases, 
society cannot perform the complex, decentralized tasks necessary to democratic 
governance.  In such countries society is de-structured, and the governance-society 
nexus is missing. 
To understand the importance of this nexus, consider some elemental tasks 
that are crucial if democracy is to function.  For a democracy to represent and then act 
on the will of its citizens in a way that makes it both fair and responsive, it must be 
able to accomplish three things: (i) the formation and articulation of shared 
preferences and opinions, (ii) the aggregation of shared preference, and (iii) the 
enforcement of accountability.  I treat preferences as wants and needs, some of which 
are individual and hence private (e.g. my favorite shoes, my favorite sandwich), and 
others of which are shared in society and hence the object of public action (preferred 
quality of roads, preferred level of taxes).  Opinions are more elaborate ideas that are 
based on these wants and needs. 
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To understand preference articulation and opinion formation, consider how 
politically relevant opinions arise in society.  The process can be divided in turn into 
three distinct elements: (a) the articulation of demands felt by many individuals, 
whose generality was previously unknown – in other words, the conversion of private 
into public preferences.  By making people realize their demands are shared, 
politicians can create political voice where before there was silence.  But shared needs 
and ideas must still be turned into specific proposals for public action.  Hence, (b) the 
contextualization of these preferences, within the conceptual framework of ideology 
or political philosophy, into coherent programs of public action (policies).  Shared 
preferences are turned into politically relevant opinions when they are set into a 
system of ideas that locates their provenance, justifies their importance, and identifies 
feasible remedies.  In other words, politicians must articulate needs in a way which 
explains where they come from, why they matter and how they can be met.  And 
lastly, (c) guiding and convincing the electorate that a particular policy/position is 
important via (a) and (b).  There will always be a number of shared preferences, and a 
number of policy options, competing for public attention.  Those that successfully 
emerge into the public arena for consideration are the ones which a majority can be 
convinced are important, and hence worthy of debate.  Where these three elements are 
not present, shared preference will not be discovered in a polity, and public opinions 
regarding shared concerns will not arise. 
Once political opinions are formed and the policy agenda has been set, society 
must find some way to weigh competing demands and the tradeoffs they imply, and 
choose which of them to pursue.  That is to say, social preferences must be 
aggregated.  This is where government and the political process come in, trading off 
the demands and needs of different groups, firms and organizations in the search for a 
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social optimum.  The most obvious way this occurs is through elections, where 
individuals vote for competing candidates/parties offering different bundles of 
policies, and the most preferred wins.  But preference aggregation occurs at many 
other levels and moments as well.  In demonstrations, marches and political rallies, 
for example; through direct contacts between citizens and politicians, whether 
personal or written; in public discussions within and amongst organizations and firms; 
through the media; in entirely private discussions between individuals or groups of 
people, which may have no overtly political aim. 
In a well- functioning democracy, preference aggregation and its necessary 
precursor – the weighing up of competing positions – occurs all the time, at many 
different levels of society, in many different ways.  It occurs most powerfully when 
large numbers of people come together to voice support for a specific political 
proposition (e.g. at a rally).  By interacting directly with each other, both they and 
politicians see their numbers and measure the strength of their commitment, and may 
gain a better sense of their possibilities.  But it also occurs, at the other extreme, when 
two or more people exchange politically-relevant views, and find commonalities or 
conflict.  Such exchanges allow individuals to gain information and insight into 
political issues and the degree to which their views are shared, and may inspire them 
to press further for change. 
Once society has expressed its preferences, formed them into political options, 
and chosen which of these it collectively wishes to pursue, it requires mechanisms 
that allow it to hold politicians to account for their actions.  At the simplest level, 
accountability exists when someone can oblige someone else to do something for him.  
In a democracy, citizens must have levers of influence over elected officials that allow 
them to ensure that socially-preferred bundles of policies are implemented with 
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reasonable efficiency.  Absent accountability, all the preceding is for naught – a 
chimera of democratic choice with no teeth, conferring upon the people little voice 
and no power. 
The most obvious accountability mechanism is, again, regular elections by 
which voters can eject unsatisfactory officials from power.  But accountability is not 
only a four-yearly event.  Like preference aggregation, it operates continuously 
through lobbying, protests, speeches and rallies; it is mediated by businesses, civic 
organizations, NGOs, interest groups, and others.  It works through the media, 
carrying information upwards as well as downwards, through the discipline of an 
independent judiciary, and through direct contacts between officials, groups and 
individuals.  Like preference aggregation it is both simple and subtle, a 
multidimensional array of commonplace tools whose simplicity, in isolation, belies 
the complex complementarities and multiple redundancies of the whole.  When it 
works, accountability informs and constrains elected officials’ actions through a 
complex, multi- layered web of relationships and obligations.  When it works, the will 
of the people is done. 
In a healthy democracy, preference formation, preference aggregation and 
accountability occur throughout society, influenced but not determined by politicians.  
All rely critically on a densely populated social infrastructure that fills the void 
between government and voters, where a diversity of civic organizations and other 
intermediating bodies operate with vigor and independence.  This relies in turn on the 
glue of trust and other social norms that bind people together and allow them to work 
toward common goals.  Where such conditions exist, a population will enjoy a gradual 
accretion of social structures that can eventually be mobilized in the interests of 
governance and development. 
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Civil society is conceived here not as atomized individuals but rather as a set 
of collectivities interacting amongst themselves and with the institutions of 
government.  Society operates as a complex of organizations, aggregating preferences 
and representing communities’ needs, mediating community participation in the 
production of certain services, facilitating social expression and the assertion of local 
identity, and enforcing political accountability on the institutions of government.  
Such organizations develop their own norms of behavior and responsibility 
organically, and over time may build up stores of trust and credibility that enhance 
capacity, or may not.  Government depends on the relationships that collectively 
comprise civil society to elicit information necessary to the policy-making process, 
judge the efficacy of previous interventions, and plan for the future.  Politicians also 
depend on these relationships to gauge public satisfaction with their performance 
between elections.  The organizational dynamics of civil society are thus intrinsic to 
the process of governance. 
This is the governance-society nexus.  It explains why the notion that a 
country’s system of government could work when its society doesn’t is ridiculous.  Its 
failure explains a large number of the development failures of the last century.  Haiti, 
Burma, Sudan – these and many other countries represent heroic attempts to impose 
functioning governments on populations riven with social fractures.21  They lack both 
coherent intermediary organizations and the social interplay between them whereby 
preferences can be discovered, and policies discussed and selected.  These are not so 
much societies as loose populations deprived of civic interaction.  Importing 
government institutions based on Western models into such countries puts the cart 
before the horse.  It is not so much that “development” failed these countries as that 
both governance and development were built on foundations of quicksand.  How 
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ironic that the new imperialism appears poised to charge, with great muscle and 
speed, into a similar trap. 
The Myth of Liberation 
The first objection is thus a straightforward contradiction.  Why is America’s 
ambition blind to it?  Consider the post-war reconstruction of Europe, and in 
particular the damaging grip the German example continues to have on our collective 
imagination.  Germany is the most impressive, successful and complete example of 
military conquest and democratization in modern history.  If a nation destroyed by 
Nazism could be rebuilt so quickly and successfully in 15 years, then surely countries 
conquered with laser-guided missiles and smart bombs can be rebuilt faster? 
This is an example of the general fallacy of liberation, which says that external 
intervention can be used to lift the constraints that oppress society, allowing it to 
spring forth and democracy to flourish.  Intervention can take the form of military 
force or development assistance.  The fallacy suffused the first half-century of 
development thinking, and now – curiously – informs the imperial project.  Its 
fundamental mistake is to ignore the differences between building and re-building.  In 
Germany’s (and Japan’s, and all of Western Europe’s) case a rich economy and a 
powerful and effective government apparatus were built on the foundation of a dense 
web of social organizations, strong traditions and norms of civic interaction, and a 
rich institutional framework.  Conquest and democratization, by contrast, imply trying 
to install liberal democracy in a tyrannized social and institutional wasteland where it 
has never before existed.  After “liberation”, when the dictator’s instruments of 
oppression have finally collapsed, there will be only a vacuum between American 
soldiers and millions of people who are confused, hungry and resentful.  Democracy 
will not thrive in such a desert. 
 14
Of course, the United States possesses the wealth and managerial ability to 
administer foreign countries militarily over extended periods, if it chooses.  The 
question of whether it will have any alternative depends on how quickly civil society 
can be (re-)built, and the social vacuum filled.  The prospects of such a thorny task are 
difficult to judge, but a priori do not appear favorable. 
To begin with, social science does not have a clear explanation of why 
effective civic organizations arise in certain places, at certain times, while elsewhere 
they do not.  But one element about which there is significant consensus is that the 
sorts of self-expressing, self-organizing structures described above require trust and 
freedom to flourish. 22  Military rule, based on obedience, command and control, 
provides neither.  Indeed, a civic infrastructure that nurtures democracy is the social 
equivalent of the decentralized market mechanism, while military occupation 
resembles a planned economy.  Far from leading naturally to the emergence of robust 
social organizations, US occupation is likely to stifle their emergence.  And with them 
the emergence of democracy. 
2. Nurturing Democracy: America’s Near Abroad 
If the conceptual case for imperial nation-building is weak, what about the 
empirical case?  What can history teach us?  The second objection takes note of the 
implicit contradiction of conquering a foreign people so that they may be free.  This 
paradox is fundamental, obvious, and risks earning America the opprobrium of 
millions around the globe.  Such a contradiction of principle can, of course, be 
overcome in practice if the conquering power establishes a government that is more 
open and free than its predecessor.  Hence the importance of the empirical question: 
do America’s bellicose means tend to result in liberal, democratic outcomes?  To 
answer this question we must look to the past, and in particular the recent past.  Here, 
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unfortunately, America’s record of forcefully transforming tyrannies into prosperous 
democracies is dismal. 
Set aside Iraq, where the outcome cannot yet be judged, and Afghanistan, 
where increasingly it can.  Consider also Panama and Grenada, where US armed 
invasions toppled governments deemed contrary to the national interest and replaced 
them with friendly regimes.  Or Guatemala and Nicaragua, where much the same was 
achieved covertly in the name of halting the spread of communism and promoting 
democracy.  These are the four clearest cases in the post-war era where the US used 
military force (overt or covert) to topple regimes of which it disapproved, on joint 
grounds of national security and the spread of democracy.  In many other countries 
American efforts were either more limited (Haiti, Somalia) or failed outright 
(Vietnam, Cuba).  But in these four countries, in its own back yard, the US had 
considerable freedom to do as it chose, and compelling incentives to do it well.  In all 
four, enemy governments were overthrown and friendly regimes installed.  What do 
these experiences teach us about the likely course of empire? 
In Panama in 1989, the US mounted a quick and successful public relations 
effort to demonize dictator and former ally Manuel Noriega, and then in December 
loosed an invasion “that killed far more Panamanians than his regime had.”23  Noriega 
was quickly ousted, and the country returned to elected democracy, and to the sons of 
the plutocrats of half a century earlier.  Fourteen years on these lords of the jungle, 
mired in apparently endless corruption scandals, preside over what the World Bank 
calls “one of the most unequal countries in the world…on par with Brazil and just 
below South Africa”.  Over 95 percent of the indigenous population live in poverty 
and 86 percent live in extreme poverty. 24 
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In Nicaragua the US sponsored a guerrilla war throughout the 1980s which 
eventually drove an exhausted leftist regime from power in 1990.  The country was 
returned to its politico-business elite, which nurtured a kleptocracy while ordinary 
Nicaraguans endured an explosion in criminal violence and the country became an 
international center for drugs transshipment.25  While politics has been shrunk into the 
parlors of the sons and daughters of privilege, the living standards of the rest remain 
below those of the 1970s.  Half the population continues to toil in the grinding 
poverty of the Western hemisphere’s second-poorest country. 26 
But neither country can compare with Guatemala.  After a US-sponsored coup 
in 1954, power became concentrated in the grasping hands of a small, white elite 
which systematically excluded the indigenous majority from the power and largesse 
of the state.  For 40 years successive right-wing governments – both civil and military 
– in effect waged war against the indigenous poor while basking in the glow of 
American friendship and aid.  Heinous abuses were committed in the name of 
defending democracy and fighting communism: over 200,000 people were killed or 
“disappeared”, and over 400 villages destroyed.27  Of these four American liberations, 
only Grenada approximates success.  Its 100,000 inhabitants have been buoyed by a 
rising tide of rich tourists and offshore banking which allowed GNP to grow healthily 
after the US invasion of 1983.28 
We do well to reflect on Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama.  In none of these 
countries did US intervention improve living standards or increase freedom for the 
average citizen.  Since intervention, their silent poor have stared into a wall of misery 
and exclusion and voted with their feet, abandoning their homelands in ever-
increasing numbers.  Under normal circumstances it would not be fair to lay all the 
blame at America’s door – many other national and international factors are 
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undoubtedly at work.  But at a time when America has launched a new empire 
promising to change foreign governments for the good of their peoples, we must 
examine the central assumption that “liberated” peoples benefit.  The four best cases 
of regime change since World War II do not suggest that the awesome destructive 
power of America’s military will be put in the service of the peace and prosperity of 
distant lands.  They do not offer hope that American imperialism will prove benign.  
More often, the evidence suggests, America will quickly turn her back on conquered 
territory once elites friendly to her have been handed power.  Little effort will be 
made to nurture democracy in more than the narrowest, mechanical sense.  Fairness, 
justice and equality will be forgotten.  So long as ruling elites remain friendly to 
Washington, much will be tolerated.  Who knows what goes on down there?  The 
citizens of America’s future enemies will examine the record and recoil.  Iraqis are 
not eager to become Guatemalans. 
3. The Military Instrument 
The third objection concerns agency.  America’s chosen instrument of post-
conquest national reorganization appears to be its armed forces.  Why this should be, 
or indeed if it should be, is entirely unclear, and has not been explained or debated in 
public.  Most likely it is an improvised answer of convenience, given the absence of 
any alterative American nation-building body.  Recent attempts to involve UN troops 
under American command strengthen this impression.  Whatever the case, consider 
the contradiction implicit in the chosen solution. 
The US military – the most potent destructive force ever devised by man – is 
uniquely unsuited by mandate and temperament to society-building, government-
building or nation-building.  A highly effective command and control organization, it 
lacks the skills required to nurture independent, lively social groups, regulate political 
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organizations, or police elections.  And this is as it should be.  The first priority of 
America’s military must always be the ability to crush enemies with overwhelming 
power.  Anything that conflicts or distracts from this goal is a burden that saps 
strength; all such burdens that can be removed should be.  But America’s new empire 
seems destined to do the opposite.  It is a dangerous irony that victory and conquest 
abroad are likely to mire US fighting forces in responsibilities unnatural to them that 
will ultimately leave them weaker. 
4. Terrorists and Soldiers 
The fourth objection is the simplest, but most damning.  This is the idea that 
invasion and conquest represent – in the narrowest military terms – a feasible solution 
to the problem of international terrorism.  Even cursory consideration of the new 
terrorism shows that an imperial strategy cannot succeed.  The most salient 
characteristics of the new terrorism are its multinational, cellular and decentralized 
organization – with relatively weak centers, where ideological capacity is located, and 
strong local nodes, where operational capacity lies.  Eschewing both physical 
presence and elaborate command structures, these movements are extremely difficult 
to localize, let alone physically attack. 
As a result, terrorist cells under assault will simply migrate.  They will vanish 
during the run-up to war, and then spring up elsewhere.  They will easily remain 
several steps ahead of a pursuing American army that knows neither whom to look for 
nor where to look for them.  And even when terrorists are captured and cells 
disrupted, their networked structures will protect the movement in the same way that 
telephone systems and electricity grids are robust to storm damage in a local loop.  
The terrorist beast is a many-headed hydra that cannot be stamped out by force one 
country at a time.  Afghanistan and Iraq have already shown this. 
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Conclusion 
In this age of instant global telecommunications, we are blessed with front-
row seats at the birth of a new American empire.  Forged in the tragedy of September 
11th, the new imperialism discards America’s traditional relationship with the 
developing world, at arm’s- length and mediated by institutions, in favor of direct 
intervention.  Where tyranny or social anomie create the conditions in which 
America-hating extremism can flourish, America will invade, conquer and reorganize 
countries.  Bold American action will serve not only her own national security, but 
also the security and prosperity of conquered peoples. 
But the imperial project is subject to four powerful objections – objections 
which doom it to failure.  Military conquest cannot and will not stamp out a terrorist 
phenomenon based on loose, international networks of independent, mobile cells.  
Terrorists will simply move.  And the medium-term goal of installing prosperous 
democracies in conquered countries is deeply flawed.  Democracy cannot be imposed 
on a population from afar because its core functions depend on the active, critical 
involvement of a rich mosaic of social groups.  And the nations that spawn terrorism 
and give it succor boast some of the most divided, dysfunctional societies on earth.  
Post-conflict military administrations will further inhibit the development of such 
organizations.  The weight of recent history supports this view: conquest will not free 
oppressed populations.  It will conquer them, leaving them enslaved.  They will see 
this, and they will not like it.  Hence the short-run goal of empire is impossible, and 
the medium-term goal may not be feasible.  And lastly, the wrong instrument has been 
chosen for both.  The US military is extremely good at destroying enemies.  There is 
no reason to think it will be good at building them back up afterwards. 
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The United States is stumbling into an empire it does not understand.  Its 
strategy is based on misconception, erroneous assumptions, and plans that are perhaps 
half thought through.  Surely the most disappointing element is the obvious lack of 
consideration given to imperial follow-through, as Afghanistan and Iraq make clear.  
Having misconstrued this new phase of foreign engagement as a series of quick wars 
followed by short occupations, the US has failed to make adequate plans for the long, 
difficult, costly process of reconstruction.  This will involve not only rebuilding 
bridges, roads and power stations, but establishing basic institutions (law, property, 
norms of political competition) and social organizations in places where little from the 
past can be rescued.  The constitution of working, effective government in “liberated” 
countries will not last a year or two, as America currently seems to think,29 but 
decades, as new people educated in the everyday practice of democracy displace a 
generation trained in the ways of tyranny. 
 Even if we ignore these harsh realities, empire is a bad choice for America.  
The will to empire marks a sharp turn away from traditional American values.  Like 
Europeans five centuries ago, the onset of empire is likely to change America 
profoundly in ways that are hard to anticipate.  Historically the United States defined 
itself not so much as a non- imperial as an anti- imperial power.  Ideals of freedom and 
self-determination were born with the nation in the fracture of empire.  Americans 
hold liberty most dear, and the prospect of a new policy to invade and replace foreign 
governments strikes at the heart of American identity and American values.  But 
unfortunate realities cannot be ignored.  Empire is also a dangerous, expensive and 
ultimately futile quest that promises to cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars.  
Seeking security and progress, America will instead reap violence and insecurity.  
American empire is a disaster in the making which we will all soon come to regret. 
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